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ABSTRACT: Argumentation schemes are common types of defeasible argument evaluated with critical questions. 
This position paper identifies and explores some unsolved problems pertaining to critical questions, such as their 
argumentative effects, their connection to burden of proof, their connection to the scheme itself, and how they 
should be represented in argument diagrams. Discussion will use the scheme for argument from practical reasoning 
as an illustrative example. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
By now, the notion of argumentation schemes (Hastings, 1963; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 
1992; Kienpointner, 1992; Walton, 1996; Blair, 2000) is well known throughout the community 
of argumentation scholars. Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns of defeasible 
reasoning that typically occur in common, everyday arguments (Blair, 2000; Walton, 1990a).1  
 Justifying them is an important task because, until recently, many common but defeasible 
forms of argument were identified as fallacious. Yet it has been shown that, in many instances, 
arguments of these types are not fallacious but instead provide provisional support for their 
conclusions. A completely systematic justification of defeasible argument schemes is ruled out 
by their non-monotonicity and the contextual determination of their acceptability. Hence Walton 
(2005) has argued that argumentation schemes require not only a systematic but also a pragmatic 
justification. Walton (2005) writes: ‘The pragmatic dimension requires that such arguments need 
to be examined within the context of an ongoing investigation of dialogue in which questions are 
being asked and answered’. Thus critical questions play an integral role in the justification of 
argumentation schemes, as well as in the evaluation of individual schematic arguments. 
 The argumentative role of critical questions is explained in relation to argumentation 
schemes. To each scheme a certain number of critical questions are attached. These questions 
have a role in the evaluation of arguments with the relevant scheme, but their precise function 
and foundation have not been agreed. Originally, critical questions seemed to have a heuristic - 
even pedagogical - role, acting as a guide for arguers in their evaluation of arguments of certain 
recognizable types. Recently, though, there has been pressure from a number of different 
 
1
 Because they can be used to classify types, or forms, of argument these schemes have come to be called 
‘argumentation schemes’. Here, we introduce the term ‘schematic argument’ to indicate a particular argument whose 
structure can be represented as being an instance of a given argumentation scheme.  
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directions that has served as a catalyst for the development of a more rigorous and robust account 
of critical questions and their relationship to the analysis and evaluation of schematic arguments.  
 First, a certain amount of theoretical pressure has been applied by commentators such as 
Blair (2001) who have called for clarification of the provenance of argumentation schemes, and 
how their associated critical questions are determined. Theoretical issues include topics like the 
following. Are the questions necessary criteria that any argument of the corresponding scheme 
should meet, or are they only guides that an arguer, wishing to criticize a schematic argument 
might want to follow? Are arguers required to use critical questions in evaluating and accepting 
schematic arguments? What is the argumentative force of posing a critical question? Do they act 
as defeaters for arguments of the associated scheme? Do they shift the burden of proof back to 
the original proponent? Or is there a burden attached to posing critical questions?  
 Further, the development of new techniques for representing the structure of schematic 
arguments, specifically in computing and artificial intelligence, have prompted a more rigorous 
specification of the way that critical questions are connected with their associated argument 
schemes, and how they can be represented in argument diagrams. How can critical questions be 
represented when diagramming the structure of schematic arguments? And, how ought they to be 
incorporated into computerized modeling of argument and automated argumentation systems?  
 
THE EVALUATIVE ROLE OF CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
 
While critical questions clearly function in the evaluation of schematic arguments, their exact 
role is unclear. Sometimes critical questions are described as if they were necessary conditions 
for the acceptability of any schematic argument. Blair, for instance, writes that critical questions 
‘are questions that must be answered appropriately if any substitution instance of a reasoning 
scheme is to be cogent’ (Blair, 2000). At other times, critical questions are said to function ‘like 
a traditional topic as a memory device’ ‘offer[ing] the user … a choice among strategies for 
probing into the weak points in an argument’ (Walton and Reed, 2003, p. 202).2 Which 
description more accurately portrays their actual role in the evaluation of argument? 
 Walton (1996) conceived of the questions as pedagogical tools, with a heuristic role in 
the dialectical evaluation of argument (Walton, 2003, p. 31). So conceived, critical questions 
play the second role more than the first. On the other hand, the effect of raising a critical question 
is to temporarily defeat the target argument, at least until the question has been satisfactorily 
answered. So, at the very least, it is a necessary condition for the acceptability of a schematic 
argument that all questions posed be satisfactorily answered. 
 Yet this is only a partial answer to the question of the actual role of critical questions in 
the evaluation of schematic arguments. Is the answering of all critical questions posed a 
sufficient condition for acceptability? Is it necessary that critical questions be posed at all? 
 
Is there a burden of questioning? 
 
Let us consider the second question first. Is it incumbent on arguers presented with schematic 
arguments to pose the relevant critical questions?3 If critical questions give acceptability criteria 
 
2
 At times, Blair describes the role of critical questions with language similar to that used by Walton and Reed, as 
for instance when he says that ‘[t]he critical questions function as a check-list to help determine whether any of the 
standard types of excepting conditions that should cancel the default is present in the given case’ (Blair, 2000).  
3
 This question has already been addressed by Walton (2003) in the context of legal argumentation. 
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for schematic arguments, then it would seem that there is a burden upon respondents to pose 
critical questions of schematic arguments before accepting their conclusions. Similarly, if one is 
not willing to accept or concede a standpoint at issue, it would seem that there is some obligation 
to raise objections to any supporting argument. On the other hand, if questions are simply 
heuristic devices designed to help critics find objections, then it is perhaps not necessary that 
they be asked as part of the evaluation of schematic arguments. So, part of the answer concerning 
whether there is a burden of questioning is given by the nature of critical questions themselves. 
 Several points bear on the answer to this question. First, once critical questions have been 
posed, it is incumbent on the proponent to satisfactorily respond to those critical questions in 
order to preserve the acceptability of her argument. So, it is a necessary condition of argument 
acceptability that, in principle, the critical questions could be answered, if posed. In practice, 
though, this requirement will be counterbalanced by several more practical considerations. 
 First, the rules governing commitment and retraction will have a bearing on the decision 
to raise questions. Some frameworks of dialogue (law, for example) operate with a notion of 
inference whereby an inference permits, rather than requires, the drawing of a conclusion from 
certain premises.4 In dialogues with a permissive notion of inference, dialogue participants are 
not obliged to accept a claim that has been argued for by an opponent, even though that argument 
provides some support for the claim and the argument itself has passed without challenge. Under 
these sorts of conditions it may not be necessary to question, or otherwise object to, an argument 
even though one is unwilling to accept its conclusion. Similarly, considerations such as whether, 
and under what conditions, a respondent is able to retract his commitment to a claim once it has 
been admitted into a dialogue will certainly have a bearing on whether, and to what extent, a 
respondent ought to raise questions about any given argument. 
 In addition to these factors, there will be practical considerations such as whether it is 
better just to press ahead with the dialogue and return to the critical questions only if it is deemed 
necessary or important at a later stage. Further, there will be strategic considerations that will 
help to determine whether critical questions ought to be raised. Such considerations might 
include: the significance of the particular claim at issue in the overall context of the dialogue and 
the mass of evidence involved, or whether there is a better way of objecting to the schematic 
argument, for instance by providing a stronger argument for an opposing claim. 
 In any real situation, then, the issues guiding critical questioning will be informed by a 
number of considerations, practical as well as strategic. So, there is a sense in which critical 
questions do provide necessary criteria for the acceptability of schematic arguments. But, it is not 
a necessary condition of every schematic argument that it in fact answer each associated critical 
question in order that its conclusion be accepted. 
 
 
4
 In the context of a critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992) or a persuasion dialogue (Wlaton and 
Krabbe, 1995) it is clear that a dialogue participant is rationally and dialectically obliged to concede (i.e. accept) any 
conclusions reached in accordance with the rules governing the dialogue. As such, should a dialogue participant be 
unwilling to make this concession, he is under considerable obligation to raise objections to the argumentation by 
which that conclusion was reached. In a permissive persuasion dialogue (Walton and Krabbe, 1995), where 
retraction is possible the participant might be able meet this rational obligation by retracting some previous 
commitment(s). 
 By contrast, in law, while disputants cannot ignore facts entered into evidence, they can ignore arguments 
made by opposing council from those facts to other conclusions. The reason for this is that the jury, or fact-finding 
body in the case, is permitted to draw conclusions from the facts entered as evidence on the basis of their own best 
rational lights (rather than required to draw the conclusions proposed by the disputants). 
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Do critical questions provide sufficient criteria for acceptability? 
 
Let us now turn to the question of whether the critical questions give sufficient conditions for the 
acceptability of schematic arguments. Several factors have a bearing on the answer to this 
question. One of the problems involved in the evaluation of defeasible argumentation schemes is 
the problem of completeness. Is the evaluation of an argumentation scheme ever sufficiently 
complete so that its conclusion should be accepted? And if so, when? 
 A first point to consider is that the schemes under consideration are non-monotonic. That 
is, the probative weight provided offered to a conclusion by the reasons is always subject to 
defeat in light of new information. In view of this, the answer to the completeness problem 
seems to be that the evaluation of any defeasible argumentation scheme can never be closed in 
any final sense, but can only be closed in some local context, in relation to some specified body 
of information. Within the global context in which it may be subject to new information which 
might bring about its default, a defeasible argument provides some, though not conclusive, 
evidence in support of its conclusion. In the absence of any reasons to the contrary, these reasons 
provide sufficient grounds for the provisional acceptance of the conclusion. As a result, the 
argumentative effect of this type of argument is to shift the burden of proof to any objector. It is 
for this reason that Walton described argumentation schemes as presumptive in nature (1996; 
forthcoming). Their effect is to create a presumption in favour of their conclusions. 
 A second aspect of the problem is whether the critical questions alone provide sufficient 
criteria within this more limited context, i.e. for the provisional acceptance of a conclusion, 
relative to a fixed body of information. The answer here seems to be that, while the questions 
contribute to the assessment of schematic arguments, they are not exhaustive of it.5 For instance, 
Pinto, Blair and Parr (1993) suggest three general assessment criteria for arguments: premise 
acceptability, acceptability of the link (relative to some given standard of evidence), and whether 
there are other relevant considerations (among the given data set) which would count against the 
claim at issue (or in favour of some counter claim). Critical questions sometimes reflect these 
assessment criteria, but sometimes they are directed specifically towards features of particular 
relevance to individual argumentation schemes. As such, even if all critical questions are 
satisfactorily answered there may be other factors affecting the cogency of a particular schematic 
argument, or the acceptability of its conclusion. Ultimately, as Walton has argued (forthcoming) 
‘[t]he solution to the completeness problem is that … [schematic arguments] should never be 
regarded as complete and closed to further questioning, until the dialogue itself has been closed. 
Only at that point is all the relevant evidence on both sides of the issue weighed up’. 
 
The completeness problem 
 
Another dimension to the completeness problem can be framed in terms of the asking of critical 
questions themselves. That is, in the context of a dialogue, when, if ever, is a respondent obliged 
to stop asking critical questions of an argument and concede the standpoint at issue? Should 
 
5
 We recognize that this paper does not provide a full answer to Blair’s (2001) concerns regarding the provenance of 
the critical questions themselves. Nor do we have a chance to address his (2000) thesis that the provenance of 
schemes will be given in relation to the warranting conditions associated with certain types of argument. These 
important topics will have to be left for later consideration.  
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there be a procedural rule that puts an end to the process of critical questioning, and if so, what 
criteria should determine that point?6 
 Part of the answer to this question depends on whether the critical question has been 
satisfactorily answered. If ever a question cannot be satisfactorily answered, then the questioning 
can be halted, because the target argument will have been diffused. But, to get a more 
theoretically robust answer to the completeness problem, it is worthwhile to consider some of the 
other argumentative features of critical questions. Suppose that a question has been given a 
preliminary answer. Can the questioning proceed with sub-questions, or with different questions? 
Here again the answer seems to be dialectical (Walton, forthcoming), and will ultimately be 
explained in terms of the burden of proof.  
 In these terms, the question of completeness is linked to the issue of whether there is a 
burden attached to posing critical questions. If we are right on this point, then the ultimate 
answer to the completeness problem is that the questioning process (like the larger process of 
raising objections) halts whenever a burden of proof cannot be met. 
 
CRITICAL QUESTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
In the end, the answer to the completeness problem must fall back on the notion of burden of 
proof. There is a burden upon the proponent to satisfactorily answer all critical questions relevant 
to the schematic argument posed by a respondent. There may or may not be an obligation on the 
part of a respondent to raise, or to pose such questions. But, in many cases, having received some 
response from the proponent to the question, it will be incumbent on the respondent to show that 
the answer is not adequate. That is, posing the question defeats the argument, until it is 
satisfactorily answered. But, in many cases, a satisfactory answer to the critical question will not 
require the introduction of new information, reasons or argument into the dialogue. In many 
cases, it will simply prompt a reflection on the part of the proponent, regarding the 
considerations made in reaching her standpoint. Yet, answering the question is sufficient to 
restore the initial presumptive status of the standpoint supported by the schematic argument, and 
shift the burden of proof back to the opponent. The only condition under which this move fails is 
if the answer is not satisfactory. But, we claim that it is the job of the questioner to show this. 
The point is that, eventually, it will fall to the questioner, not the proponent, to introduce new 
evidence into the dialogue. This accords with the argumentative effects of presumptive 
arguments, which shift the burden of proof to the respondent.  
 It is not the job of the answerer (i.e. the proponent) to show that her answers are 
satisfactory. Rather, the burden is on the questioner to show that an answer is unsatisfactory. 
This raises the important question of whether there is a burden of proof attached to questioning. 
 
Is there a burden in questioning? 
 
When the issue of critical questions was first discussed in the literature, the prevailing view was 
that no burden of proof attached to asking critical questions. It is commonly accepted that parties 
making assertions incur a burden of proof to successfully defend their assertions with acceptable 
reasons, and that they bear an obligation to retract those assertions that they cannot successfully 
defend. Yet, such a burden is not commonly associated with asking questions. In the first place, 
it was tacitly held that there was no burden on the part of a respondent to pose any critical 
 
6
 This problem has also been addressed by Walton (forthcoming). 
THE NATURE AND STATUS OF CRITICAL QUESTIONS 481 
questions in the first place. And secondly, it was thought that ‘to ask an appropriate critical 
question in a dialogue shifts the burden of proof back onto the side of the proponent of the 
original argument to reply to this question successfully’ (Walton, 1996, p. 15). Recent 
developments have challenged both of these views.  
 As mentioned above, Walton (2003) has recently argued that there may be a burden to 
question – that is to raise critical questions – in certain types of dialogues, or in certain 
argumentative circumstances. In the second place, when trying to specify how critical questions 
can be represented in models diagramming the structure of argument schemes, it was discovered 
that certain critical questions might best be seen as having a burden of proof attached to them 
(Walton and Reed, 2003; Prakken, Reed and Walton, 2004).  
 Prakken, Reed and Walton (2004), and Walton and Reed (2003) have argued that, since 
different critical questions relate to their associated schematic arguments in different ways, 
sometimes there is a burden of proof attached to raising a critical question while in other cases 
there is not. For example, if a critical question is addressed to some assumption at work in the 
argument as an implicit premise, then there is no burden of proof attached to raising questions 
about the acceptability of those assumptions. These critical questions seem to function normally, 
automatically shifting the burden of proof back to the original proponent of the argument, 
without themselves bringing any burden of proof back to the questioner. On the other hand, some 
critical questions appear to instead raise allegations against an argument. That is, in order that 
the questions have the critical force they do, they themselves rest on some implicit claim which 
serves as an objection to the argument. As a result, it would seem that some critical questions do 
not automatically shift the burden of proof back to the proponent. Rather, some critical questions 
seem to have a positive burden of proof attached. In summary, some critical questions represent 
‘additional assumptions of the argument … while others function as staring points for finding 
rebuttals’ (Walton and Reed, 2003, p. 208). While the former have no burden of proof attached, 
the latter do. 
 
Analysis of a sample scheme: Practical Reasoning 
  
 Walton, Reed and Prakken based their conclusions on the analysis of the scheme from 
expert opinion. Here, we consider how this analysis applies to other schemes. For the purposes of 
illustration we have selected the scheme of practical reasoning as given below (Walton, 1990b, 
p. 48; Walton 1997, p. 165). 
 
Practical Reasoning: Necessary Condition Schema 
 
(NI) My goal is to bring about A (Goal Premise). 
(N2) I reasonably consider on the given information that bringing about at least one of 
[B0,B1,...,Bn] is necessary to bring about A (Alternatives Premise). 
(N3) I have selected one member Bi as an acceptable, or as the most acceptable necessary 
condition for A (Selection Premise). 
(N4) Nothing unchangeable prevents me from bringing about Bi as far as I know (Practicality 
Premise). 
(N5) Bringing about A is more acceptable to me than not bringing about Bi (Side Effects 
Premise). 
Therefore, it is required that I bring about Bi (Conclusion). 
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Critical questions 
CQ1 : Are there alternative means of realizing A, other than B? [Alternative means question] 
CQ2: Is B an acceptable (or the best) alternative? [Acceptable/Best Option Possible Question] 
CQ3 : Is it possible for agent a to do B? [Possibility Question]  
CQ4 : Are there negative side effects of a’s bringing about B that ought to be considered? 
[Negative Side Effects Question] 
CQ5 : Does a have the goals other than A, which have the potential to conflict with a’s realizing 
A? [Conflicting Goals Question] 
 
In the case of argument from expert opinion, whether there is a burden attached to questioning 
can be determined according to whether the question acts to challenge an implicit assumption, or 
whether it serves as a starting point for objections. Let us see whether this test applies to the 
scheme of practical reasoning introduced above.  
 Here, it would seem that the test criteria cannot be applied in a clear-cut way. In the first 
place, each critical question is clearly associated with some premise explicitly stated in the 
argument. So, it would seem that none of the questions have a burden attached to them.  
 This is correct to a point, since these questions can be posed in a relatively innocuous 
manner, where they do not have a refuting or objecting function, but simply serve to probe a bit 
further into the argument. As such, while the proponent has a burden to answer each question 
asked, this burden can be met in a relatively perfunctory way. For instance, with the alternative 
means question the proponent might respond simply by saying something like ‘No. I can’t think 
of any alternative means of realizing A other than those given in the list of B’ or ‘Well, those are 
all of the options I can think of. Can you think of any others?’ So, by responding to the question, 
the proponent has met her burden, and the presumptive status of her original argument is 
restored. 
 We can see that, if the question is to serve as an objection in any further sense something 
else must happen. Namely, it must be shown that the proponent’s answer is unsatisfactory. Yet, 
as we have stated above, it is the responsibility of the respondent to show this. In this case this 
would be done by finding examples of alternatives not considered in the initial argument. Indeed, 
in the latter answer above, the proponent explicitly shifts the burden of proof associated with the 
question back upon the questioner by inviting him to come up with alternatives not initially 
considered. Such alternatives would have the force of objections and would go towards showing 
the unacceptability of the move from the alternatives premise to the selection premise in the 
initial argument. 
 This reveals the second sense in which a question can be posed, namely as an objection to 
the argument. Here, the question is asked in a rhetorical voice, whereby a negative answer is 
implicit in the question. For example, in the alternative means question, it is assumed that there 
actually is some alternative means that has not been considered by the proponent in her initial 
argument. Yet, this implicit assertion on the part of the respondent comes with a burden of proof 
attached. As such, if the question is to serve as an objection in this stronger sense, there is some 
burden in questioning. 
  In examining the practical reasoning scheme, it seems that each of the critical questions 
can be posed either in a weak sense (as a means of probing further into the argument) or in a 
strong sense (as a challenge, or objection to the argument). Further, whether the question has a 
burden attached depends on how it is asked. If it is asked in the weak sense, then it functions 
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normally in shifting the burden of proof back on the proponent. This alone may be enough to 
diffuse the initial argument if, for instance, the proponent realizes on reflection that there are 
several options which she had not initially considered. On the other hand, if the question is to go 
further and act as an objection then it has a positive burden of proof attached to it. This can be 
explained in several ways. First, it is the dialectical responsibility of the questioner to show that 
the proponent’s answers to the questions are unsatisfactory. Second, in serving as an objection 
there will generally be some implicit assertion at work in the question giving it its force as an 
objection. Yet, assertions (even implicit ones) come with positive burdens of proof attached. 
 So, the issue of whether there is a burden of proof attached to questioning can be 
explained in terms of how the question functions in the argument. This will contribute to the 
question of how critical questions ought to be modeled in argument diagrams. 
 
REPRESENTING CRITICAL QUESTIONS IN ARGUMENT DIAGRAMS 
 
The problem of dealing with critical questions has significant implications for the field of AI, 
where defeasibility of reasoning is a central issue. Pollock (1995, pp. 38-41, 85-86), early on, 
drew an important distinction between two kinds of defeat relations among arguments. They 
could be called rebuttals and undercutters. A rebuttal is a strong form of defeat of a given 
argument and poses a counter-argument to the conclusion of the original argument. An 
undercutter is a weaker form of defeat of an original argument that attacks the inference that was 
used in the original argument to derive the conclusion from the premises. The problem is that 
there seems to be no standard way of representing critical questions on an argument diagram. 
The reason is that sometimes critical questions act as rebuttals, while in other instances they act 
as undercutters only.  
 In the standard diagramming system, like that represented in Araucaria (Reed and Rowe, 
2001), this distinction is problematic to represent in any way that does not make the diagram so 
complex that it becomes harder to learn for the average user. Rebuttal can be represented 
straightforwardly by the device called a ‘refutation’. But to build in undercutters, other notions 
need to be brought in that start to get into dialogue concepts. For use with helping students think 
critically and diagram arguments, bringing in such subtler notions of how an argument is 
defeasible, might make the system cumbersome to use and hard to teach.  
 However, in other systems, where the application is to legal users, the system needs to 
deal extensively with defeasible argumentation, and such complications are needed. In his 
system for building an argument diagram (Verheij, 2005), critical questions acting as 
undercutters of a given argument are represented on the argument diagram by the device of 
entanglement. Verheij argued that in legal systems critical questions have four roles: 
(1) criticizing a schemes’ premises,  
(2) pointing to exceptional situations in which the scheme should not used,  
(3) setting conditions for a scheme’s use, and  
(4) pointing to other possible arguments relevant to a scheme’s conclusion.  
Concerning the first role, Verheij argued that there should be no need for explicit critical 
questions that merely ask whether a premise of a scheme is true or not. The given argument is 
represented on the diagram in the usual way as an arrow (representing a linked or convergent 
pattern) joining a set of premises to a conclusion. The undercutter, represented by the asking of 
an appropriate critical question, is represented as another arrow pointing to the original arrow.  
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 Verheij’s system thus, inevitably, has quite a different way of handling critical questions 
from the more standard systems of argument diagramming like Araucaria. These developments 
suggest that there might be no one right way to deal with critical questions in AI. It may depend 
on what the system is supposed to be used for. There might be different systems for different 
users. 
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